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RISE: A RelIable and SEcure Scheme for Wireless Machine to
Machine Communications
Wei Ren , Linchen Yu, Liangli Ma, and Yi Ren
Abstract: Wireless Machine to Machine (M2M) communications enable ubiquitous sensing, controlling, and acting
via sensors, actuators, and actors. Reliability and security are of foremost importance in wireless M2M systems.
A simple, target distinguishing attack can result in M2M’s failure. This paper presents a RelIable and SEcure
scheme, RISE, which is a package of policies that guarantee the reliability of data (including sensor reports and
actuator instructions) and devices (including sensors, actuators, and actors). The data reliability is improved by four
algorithms, ChooseMedian, ChooseMost, ChooseNearest, and Trust-based Enhancement. Report attainability
is improved via m repeat-sending and n multiple-reporting algorithms.

Device reliability is guaranteed by

device-indistinguishability, which comprises data-indistinguishability and behavior-indistinguishability. The security
requirements are formally defined, and the security analysis proves the soundness and completeness of the
scheme.
Key words: Machine to Machine (M2M); reliability; security; target distinguishing attack
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Introduction

Machine to Machine (M2M) communications may
be the communication paradigm for many future
applications such as the Internet of Things, wireless
reactive sensor networks, and wireless network
robotics[1-6] . The key difference between M2M and
traditional communications is that M2M usually has
no human involvement. Thus, it enables complete
automation and adaptive control from far way to save
labor and improve efficiency.
Since there is no human participation, M2M
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communications have critical problems in reliability
and security that hinder large scale deployment. For
example, when actors wait for instructions from
actuators but all instructions are dropped in the
communication channels, the actors will suspend for
next operations. Or, if sensing results are all lost in the
transmissions, the actuators will respon to the wrong
control instruction and launch incorrect feedback.
The reliability is, thus, of foremost importance
due to the absence of double checking manually.
Moreover, all sensing reports and instructions should
maintain integrity to defend against modifications in the
transmissions. Security is, thus, a basic requirement.
The reliability problem is also a challenge in
the M2M context without human assistance, due to
long distance transmissions, intermediate routing, and
wireless tampering and sniffing. Moreover, if attackers
can identify sensors, actuators, and actors, they can
easily drop actuator instructions to terminate M2M
controls.
M2M reliability and security is a new problem with
some works starting to address user[7-11] . To the best
of our knowledge, this paper makes the first attempt
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to solve the reliability and security problem in M2M,
especially using an approach with formal definitions
and rigorous analysis.

2
2.1

Problem Formulation
Network model

There are three major entities in wireless M2M
scenario, as depicted in Fig. 1.
(1) Sensors — wireless devices that sense or collect
the required monitoring data, and report the data to
actuator devices.
(2) Actuators — wireless devices that generate
control or action instructions according to the received
monitoring data, and report to actor devices.
(3) Actors — wireless
devices
that
execute
instructions sent from actuator devices.
The following concepts are defined:
Definition 1 Reports
Sensing or monitoring
data.
Definition 2 Instructions Control or action data.
Definition 3 Data Reports or instructions.
Definition 4 Devices Communication peers in
the M2M system.
Definition 5 Sensors The peers send reports to
actuators.
Definition 6 Actuators The peers receive reports
from sensors, and send instructions to actors.
Definition
7 Actors The
peers
receive
instructions from actuators.
These three devices are usually physically different.
It is a typical scenario, in which the discussion can
also be extended to other situations. Thus, in some
cases, some entities may be one device physically, e.g.,
sensing and actor devices may be the same physical
objects.
All devices access the network via wireless
communications. The core network could be wired or
wireless network.

Fig. 1

Network model for wireless M2M.

2.2
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Attack model, security requirements, and
design goals

Adversaries reside in the communication channels
between devices. They may sniff, modify, and forge
data. Thus, the system must protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity of the data.
The attackers in the channels may also recover a key
used for data encryption and integrity. The system
must provide resilience to key exposures. That is, the
exposure of a key will not result in exposure of previous
or future data.
In wireless M2M systems, the devices are exposed
and can be captured or compromised by attackers.
It is assumed that strong attacker exists who can
physically hijack sensors to report wrong reports, or
hijack actuators to send erroneous instructions.
Since the devices may also have energy constraints,
the system will not rely the public key cryptosystems
and a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The system is assumed
to have pre-loaded pair-wise secret master keys on each
device upon deployment.
The unique feature of M2M systems requires some
further requirements for reliability and security in the
following.
2.2.1 Data reliability
(1) Detection and deletion of authenticated but fake
reports. Unauthenticated reports are fake. Some sensors
may be compromised, thus authenticated reports may
also be fake. The system must be able to discover and
delete fake reports before actuators actually respond.
(2) Report attainability. If channels delete some
reports, the reports can still reach actuators or the
actuators can still respond properly.
(3) Detection and deletion of authenticated but fake
instructions. Since the actuators may be compromised,
instructions can be fake even though the instruction is
authenticated. Thus, the system must be able to discover
and delete fake instructions before actors execute those
instructions.
(4) Instruction attainability. If channels delete some
instrutions, the instrutions can still reach actors or the
actors can still respond properly.
2.2.2 Device reliability
Definition 8
Target Distinguishing Attack The
target distinguishing attack is a typical M2M attack
that must be defended against because it can be
easily launched by attackers. That is, if attackers can
distinguish which devices are sensors, actuators, and
actors, they will be able to easily launch such attack
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by tampering the target’s wireless signals, e.g., the
actuator’s channels, or simply dropping packets in
the channels, e.g., reports or instructions, to result
in abnormal M2M performance. If attackers can not
distinguish between devices, they will have to tamper
all device signals or drop all packets to cause M2M
failure, which significantly increase the attack cost and
detection possibility.
Indistinguishability of devices. The system must
make it difficult for attackers to distinguish between
the sensors, actuators, and actors. Indistinguishability
requires two properties:
Indistinguishability of data. Attackers can not
distinguish devices by observing the traffic patterns
along the channels, such as the data length and data
interval. Therefore, report lengths should be the same
as instruction lengths.
Indistinguishability of behavior. Attackers can not
distinguish devices by observing the communication
patterns at the ends, such as data sending and receiving.
Thus, the system should hide the events that sensors
always send data, actors always receive data, and
actuators both send and receive data.
2.2.3

Key exposure resilience

If the attackers in the channels gain access to the
encryption and integrity keys, the data before and
after the exposure should still remain secret and attain
integrity.
The design goals are thus to develop a reliable and
secure scheme for wireless M2M communications.

3

RISE Schemes

This section describe the components used to address
the problems and achieve the design goals. Some of
the major notation used in the remainder of the paper is
listed in Table 1.
Table 1
Symbol
ID
fgK
Ksa
Kaa
Ki
Kc
Report
Instruction
Data
Time

Notation.
Meaning

Sensor identity
Encryption by K.
Sensor-actuator pairwise secret key
Actuator-actor pairwise secret key
Transient integrity key
Transient cipher key
Sensor result
Actuator control statement to an actor
Reports or instructions
Time-stamp

3.1

Confidentiality and integrity protection

A simple scheme was developed to protect data
confidentiality and integrity. Suppose each sensoractuator pair shares a secret key Ksa . Besides, each
actuator-actor pair shares a secret key Kaa . The report
message format is thus:
Sensor ! Actuator: fID; Report; TimegKc ;
Hash.ID; Report; Time; Ki /:
Since the key used in the communication channel
may be revealed by the attackers, the system always
uses two transient keys Kc and Ki . They are generated
by
Kc D Hash.Ksa ; Time; 0/; Ki D Hash.Ksa ; Time; 1/;
Similarly, the instruction is protected as follows:
Actuator ! Actor: fID; Instruction; TimegKc ;
Hash.ID; Instruction; Time; Ki /:
If reports or instructions are both denoted as Data, the
protection can be rewritten uniformly as:
Sender ! Receiver: fID; Data; TimegKc ;
Hash.ID; Data; Time; Ki /:
3.2

Data reliability

3.2.1

Detection and deletion of authenticated but
fake reports
Definition 9 Authenticated but Fake Report It is
the report whose authenticity is verified by the message
authentication code, but is indeed a fake report. Since
sensors may be compromised by attackers, attackers
can modify the report content before generation of the
message authentication code. Thus, the report may be
fake even though the report is authenticated.
Suppose the system deploys multiple sensors (instead
of one) to report a monitoring event or an environmental
parameter. Suppose n sensors report the event with
values v1 ; v2 ;    ; vn to the actuator. If a value does
not satisfy authentication verification, the value will be
dropped. Otherwise, the actuator will detect and delete
the fake report by the following policies.
Policy 1 Choose-Median Choose a median value
as the final report. (1) Sort all n values from the largest
to the least. (2) Output the value at position n=2. The
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 ChooseMedian Algorithm
Require: vŒ1; vŒ2;    ; vŒn
Ensure: FinalReport
vŒ1; vŒ2;    vŒn ( Sort.v1 ; v2 ;    ; vn /
FinalReport ( vŒb.n C 1/=2c
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Sort() is a standard function, it is thus left as
a subfunction to simplify the algorithm. The time
complexity of the algorithm is the same as the sort
function, O.n2 /.
Policy 2 Choose-Most Choose the value that is
most reported. (1) Partition all n values into different
sets, with each set having the same value. (2) Choose
the set with the largest set size, and output the value in
this set. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Since partition function is not a standard function
call, it is implemented in the algorithm. In this
implementation, time complexity of algorithm is
O.n2 /.
Policy 3 Choose-Nearest Choose the value that
is nearest
to the average. (1) Compute di for each value
Pn
i D1 vi
as vN D
; di D .vi v/
N 2 : (2) Sort di and choose
n
the least one. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.
The time complexity of Average() is O.n/. The time
complexity of Sort() is O.n/. Thus, the time complexity
of the algorithm is O.n2 /.
Policy 4 Trust-based Enhancement The detection
accuracy is enhanced by utilizing the historical record
from these three policies. The actuator maintains a trust
table <ID, Trust> that records the heuristics, where ID
is the sensor identity, and Trust indicates the possibility
that sensor ID is a source of fake reports. Trust is
measured by two metrics:
Metric 1 Number of verification failures This
reflects the number of times that data has been modified
Algorithm 2 ChooseMost Algorithm
Require: vŒ1; vŒ2;    ; vŒn
Ensure: FinalReport
Partition vŒ1; vŒ2;    ; vŒn into sets with the same value.
for (i D 1 to n) do
for (j D i C 1 to n) do
if (vŒi Š D 0:AND:vŒj  DD vŒi ) then
vŒj  ( 0
sŒi  ( sŒi  C 1
end if
end for
end for
Find the largest sŒi 
for (i D 1 to n) do
if (s < sŒi ) then
s ( sŒi 
loc ( i
end if
end for
FinalReport ( vŒloc
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Algorithm 3 ChooseNearest Algorithm
Require: vŒ1; vŒ2;    ; vŒn
Ensure: FinalReport
barv ( Average.vŒ1; vŒ2;    ; vŒn/
for (i D 1 to n) do
d Œi ( .vŒi barv/2
end for
Find the least d Œi
for (i D 1 to n) do
if (d > d Œi) then
d ( d Œi
loc ( i
end if
end for
FinalReport ( vŒloc

along communication channels. A verification failure
occurs when a received hash value does not equal the
hash value calculated by the receiver. If data does
not satisfy the verification check, Trust for that IDs is
reduced by one.
Metric 2 Number of deletions
This reflects
the probability of a device being compromised. The
number of deletion is the number of times that the
reported value from ID is not chosen by the ChooseMedian, Choose-Most, or Choose-Nearest policies. In
the Choose-Median Policy, the deletion values are the
values not chosen. In the Choose-Most Policy, the
deletion values are the values not in the chosen set. In
the Choose-Nearest Policy, the deletion values are the
values not equal to the chosen value. Trust for that ID
will be reduced by one.
Trust-based Enhancement will then choose the ID
with the highest Trust when multiple IDs exist after
applying via Policies I, II, and III. The algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 4.
The time complexity of the algorithm is still O.n2 /.
3.2.2

Report attainability

Definition 10
Report attainability This is the
probability that the report on a given event from the
sensors arrives at the corresponding actuator.
Report attainability can be improved by two policies:
Policy 5 m Repeat-Sending This improves the
attainability by defending against the tampering attacks
and packet dropping attacks in the communication
channels. Each sensor sends each report m times. Even
if some of them are dropped, the report still can reach
to the actuator.
Policy 6 n Multiple-Reporting This improves
the attainability by defending against sensor being
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compromised together with packet dropping in the
communication channels. This has already been
proposed for detection and deletion of authenticated but
fake reports. Since each event is reported by n sensors,
the report attainability is improved even if some reports
are dropped.
Proposition 1 If a channel randomly drops packets
passing through the channel with probability pd , the
report attainability is .1 pdmn / after m repeat-sending
and n multiple-reporting.
Proof Packet dropping in channels occurs with a
random probability pd . There are m  n packets for the
same event. Analyzing this as a Bernoulli experiment,
the probability that all packets are dropped is pdmn . The
probability that at least one packet is not dropped is,
thus, 1 pdmn .

Besides, Repeat-Response policy will be used in case
report attainability is zero. If the actors can not receive
instructions, they will stop acting. To avoid this, the
actuator will always send instructions, even when they
have not received valid reports. If all the reports are
faked or dropped by the communication channels, the
actuators will repeat the last instruction. The instruction
also encloses a tag that notifies the actor that this is a
repeat instruction due to having no valid reports.
Finally, this method can also be applied to detection
and deletion of authenticated but fake instructions for
instruction attainability.
3.3

Reliability of devices

The security requirements are formally stated at first.
Algorithm 4 Trust-based Enhancement Algorithm
Require: vŒ1; vŒ2;    ; vŒn
Ensure: FinalReport
FinalReportŒ1 ( ChooseMedian./
FinalReportŒ2 ( ChooseMost./
FinalReportŒ3 ( ChooseNearest./
Actuator returns corresponding ID for a given value by
checking the packet fields
for i D 1 to 3 do
IDŒi  ( ReturnID.FinalReportŒi /
end for
Find the largest IDŒi  in trust table
for (i D 1 to 3) do
if (trust < TrustŒi ) then
trust ( TrustŒi 
loc ( i
end if
end for
FinalReport ( FinalReportŒloc

Definition 11 Negligible function A function u W
N ! .0; 1/ is said to be negligible if for every c > 0,
for all sufficiently large n (for example, when n > N ),
u.n/ < 1=nc . We call u.n/ a negligible function and
denote it as negl.n/.
To simplify the following, the abstract notation called
*-Indistinguishability or IND-* secure.
Definition 12 *-Indistinguishability(IND-* secure)
If any Polynomial Time Turning Machine (PTTM) at
the communication links can distinguish whether the
sender is a sensor, actuator, or actor from Data with
only a probability negl.n/ (n is a security parameter),
the scheme has the *-Indistinguishability property, or is
IND-* secure. That is,
I.CONJECTUREI OBSERVATION/ D
H.CONJECTURE/ H.CONJECTUREj
OBSERVATION/ < negl.n/;
where I.I / is mutual information; CONJECTURE
is an event when attackers correctly conjecture the
packet source (to be a sensor, actuator, or actor),
OBSERVATION is the information collected by the
attackers (that is data in the channels and behavior at
the ends), H./ is the entropy function, and “*” is a wild
card character to represent any property.
As said in the security requirement section, the basic
security requirement is Device-Indistinguishability
(IND-DEVICE secure for short) to defend the target
distinguishing attack. This requirement is satisfied
using Data-Indistinguishability for data in the channel,
and Behavior-Indistinguishability for the behavior at the
ends. This leads to the following propositions.
Proposition 2 Device-Indistinguishability ,
Data-Indistinguishability
+
BehaviorIndistinguishability,
where “,” means “equivalent”.
Proof Straightforward.

Proposition 3 IND-DEVICE secure ) INDDATA secure,
where “)” means “imply”.
Proof Straightforward.

Proposition 4 IND-DEVICE secure ) INDBEHAVIOR secure.
Proof Straightforward.

3.3.1

Data-Indistinguishability (IND-DATA)

To defend against the target distinguishing attack,
attackers should not be able to distinguish devices by
observing the data (traffic content and patterns) in the
channels. The data information includes the length,
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interval, and data linkages. The following policies are,
thus, proposed:
Policy 7
Length-Indistinguishability (INDLENGTH secure) For IND-LENGTH secure, the
lengths of reports and instruction packets should be the
same. This is already achieved by data confidentiality
where the data is encrypted and the resulting ciphertexts
have the same lengths.
Proposition 5 IND-DATA secure ) INDLENGTH secure.
Proof Straightforward.

Policy 8
Format-Indistinguishability (INDFORMAT secure) Since the data packet format needs
to be parsed by routers in the channels and can not be
protected by data confidentiality, the packet formats for
reports and instructions should be indistinguishable.
This is also already achieved by data confidentiality,
because the packet representation layer is ciphertext
and the underlying layers are the same for both.
Proposition 6 IND-DATA secure ) INDFORMAT secure.
Proof Straightforward.

If M2M is enabled using IPv6 (e.g., 6LowPAN)
and remotely accessible without network address
translation, data packets can be routed in the
communication channel. Attackers in the channels can
thus observe some open fields in the packets such as
the source address and destination address. Roughly
speaking, the system should always hide patterns such
as sensors always send data, actors always receive
data, and actuators both send and receive data. The
source addresses and destination addresses should also
be equally presented.
Policy 9
Address-Indistinguishability (INDADDRESS secure) The number of different source
addresses is equal to the number of different destination
addresses. Thus, n sensors should send reports to
n actuators and each report should be repeated m
times. The n actuators have different addresses but
share the same ID. Similarly, the n actuators also send
instructions to n actors, with each instruction repeated
m times. The n actors will also send n dummy packets
to n sensors, with each repeated m times. Therefore, all
the addresses used as source addresses and destination
addresses will have the same occurrences. This policy
is called Triangle Policy.
Proposition 7 IND-DATA secure ) INDADDRESS secure.
Proof Straightforward.
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Policy 10
Interval-Indistinguishability (INDINTERVAL secure) The sending interval of all sensors
for the same event are the same, denoted as I . The
sending intervals for actuators and actors are also I .
I is usually equal to or larger than the round trip time
for the sensor-actuator-actor triangle. Any device can
suspend for a random r 2 Œ0; S  seconds and then send
out packets. If S D 0, I will be equal to the round trip
time of the triangle (denoted as RTT). If S > 0, I will
be larger than RTT. More specifically, I = RTT + 3S/2
on average. This policy is called Same-Gap Policy.
Proposition 8 IND-DATA secure ) INDINTERVAL secure.
Proof Straightforward.

A nontrivial proposition will be proofed next to
guarantee the completeness of the proposed policies.
Proposition 9 IND-LENGTH secure + INDFORMAT secure + IND-ADDRESS secure + INDINTERVAL , IND-DATA secure.
Proof Suppose a data packet has the form
hplainfields; cipherfieldsi. Since it is IND-LENGTH
secure and IND-FORMAT secure, the packet can be
simplified as haddrs ; addrd i, where in the plainfields the
addrs and addrd are the representative fields. Since
it is IND-ADDRESS secure and Triangle Policy is
used, all addresses occur equally in addrs and addrd .
Attackers, thus, can not distinguish sensors, actuators,
and actors from the number of occurrences of addrs
and addrd . Even if some data packets are dropped,
distinguishing different devices is also hard due to the
Triangle Policy. The Triangle Policy guarantees INDDATA security in terms of space dimension, while
the Same-Gap Policy guarantees IND-DATA security
in terms of time dimension. Stated informally, the
Triangle Policy makes the vertices indistinguishable,
while the Same-Gap Policy makes different triangles
indistinguishable.

3.3.2

Behavior indistinguishability

Attackers can not distinguish devices by observing the
communication behavior at the ends. The attackers can
sniff the communication behavior such as the lasting
time and the intervals between sending signals. Thus,
the system should hide the following patterns-sensors
always send, actors always receive, and actuators both
send and receive.
Policy 11
Send-Lasting-Indistinguishability
(IND-SEND-LASTING secure)
The lasting time
(duration) for the sending behavior at each device
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is the same. This is already implied by LengthIndistinguishability.
Proposition 10 IND-LENGTH secure ) INDSEND-LASTING secure.
Proof Straightforward.

Policy 12
Send-Interval-Indistinguishability
(IND-SEND-INTERVAL secure)
The number of
sending behavior at each device is the same. This is
already implied by Interval Indistinguishability.
Proposition 11 IND-INTERVAL secure ) INDSEND-INTERVAL secure.
Proof Straightforward.

Therefore, these two propositions lead to:
Proposition 12 IND-DATA secure ) INDBEHAVIOR secure.
Proof Straightforward.

3.4

Implementation details

The Triangle Policy and the Same-Gap Policy can be
implemented by the following procedure.
(1) Deploy n sensors for monitoring each event.
Also deploy p .1 6 p 6 n/ actuators that are related to
these n sensors. These p actuators have n addresses.
Then deploy q .1 6 q 6 n/ actors that also have n
addresses and are related to the n sensors. This can be
easily done in wireless channels. Therefore, regardless
of the physical number of devices, a sensor-actuatoractor triangle can be assembled with 3n pairs of
haddrs ; addrd i with n addresses occurred in both addrs
and addrd only once.
(2) Once an event happens, the n sensors will send
reports to p actuators (or n virtual actuators). The p
actuators will suspend for random r1 2 Œ0; S  seconds
and then send the instructions to the q actors. The q
actors will suspend for random r2 2 Œ0; S  seconds
and then send dummy packets to the n sensors. The
n sensors will suspend for random r3 2 Œ0; S  seconds
before sending the next reports to the actuators.
(3) Even though some packets are dropped by the
channels and do not reach the designated vertex, each
vertex will always send n packets to the next vertex.
(4) Together with the m Repeat-Sending Policy, each
vertex repeats the transmission of the same packet m
times.

4

Related Work

The security of M2M communications is attracting
much attention[9, 11] , but there are few solutions. Lu
et al.[11] first pointed out the reliability and security

requirements in M2M communications. Fadlullah
et al.[10] studied the detection of malicious activities
in smart grid communications and proposed an
early warning system. Bartoli et al.[8] studied secure
aggregation in smart grid M2M networks. They
included security designs in the physical layer and
the MAC layer. Bartoli et al.[1] reviewed the current
undergoing standards for M2M communications. Alam
et al.[7] studied the interoperability in security attributes
between different administrative domains in the Internet
of Things with a layered architecture.

5

Conclusions

This paper described the critical security requirements
for reliability of data and reliability of devices. An
attack-target distinguishing attack in M2M is then
defined. A confidentiality and integrity protection
scheme is given for report and instruction. The
data reliability is based on the four algorithms,
ChooseMedian, ChooseMost, ChooseNearest, and
Trust-based Enhancement. Report attainability is
improved by implementing m repeat-sending and n
multiple-reporting. Device reliability is guaranteed
by device-indistinguishability, which includes dataindistinguishability and behavior-indistinguishability.
A formal analysis of the security of the proposed
schemes shows their soundness and completeness.
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